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J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: GenderBased Peremptory Challenges On Trial
Why do we love this trial by jury? Because it prevents
the hand of oppression from cutting you off.'
INTRODUCTION

The American public is captivated by every aspect of jury trials, from
their initial stages to the verdict and sentencing, and all phases in-between.
So fascinated are we with the American way of justice, that a cable-access
television network2 devotes its entire format to legal disputes, broadcasting
trials throughout the country each week.3 But what the American public
can really relate to is the jury selection process, because it potentially affects
each of us as citizens of the United States. A criminal defendant's fate lies
in the hands of a group of people whom she or he has never met. In civil
cases, the jury decides how much money defendants must pay to successful
plaintiffsS--in some cases millions of dollars. Not everyone commits a
crime in her or his lifetime, but nearly everyone over the age of twenty-one
has the possibility to sit on a jury,6 hear a case, and determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused person.

3 THE

1. Patrick Henry in the Virginia convention, June 20, 1788, in Jonathan Elliot, ed.,

DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 540 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 1835).

2. Court TV TM . Court TV TM is a television network whereby television film crews
travel around the country to record and broadcast actual footage of all phases of a variety of
trials in progress.
3. See id. The William Kennedy Smith trial, the Menendez brothers' trials, and the
O.J. Simpson coverage are examples of genuine courtroom television drama.
4. See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN
COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 1 (1977). According to Van Dyke, "[tlhe jury
is the most democratic of our institutions. The idea itself--that ordinary citizens without
experience in judicial decision-making should be impaneled to decide issues of great
importance--is an unusual one in the world today." See also Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (finding that "Ulury competence is an individual rather than a group
or class matter").
5. See generally VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 1-13.
6. See id. at 258-62.
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Before a person actually has the privilege of sitting on a jury, 7 she or
he must first receive a notice to serve' and then advance past the voir dire
process9 of challenges for cause"0 and peremptory challenges." Some
individuals have never survived the peremptory challenge stage, either
because of their race or gender, or perhaps even both. However, because
of the landmark decision reached in Batson v. Kentucky 2 and the more
recent decision in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,' 3 both the prosecution
and defense counsel may not discriminate on the basis of race' 4 or
gender 5 during the process of selecting jurors.
This article examines the recent United States Supreme Court decision
in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B."6 Part I offers a brief history of the
peremptory challenge and its relationship to the Equal Protection Clause of8
7
the Fourteenth Amendment by examining the Batson v. Kentucky
decision. Part II addresses the facts and procedural posture of J.E.B.'9 and
discusses the Supreme Court's opinion. Part III includes the author's
analysis of the opinion and proposes a limitation on the number of
peremptory challenges allowed during jury selection. Part IV ponders the
impact of limiting discriminatory practices employed during the exercise of
peremptory challenges to race and gender, as well as the impact of an
7. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (1774), Article 5;
reprinted in Charles C. Tansil, ed., DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE
UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1927) ("the respective colonies are entitled to.
. the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of vicinage, according to
the course of [common] law"); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991)
(contending that "with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of
jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process").
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1988 & Supp. V).
9. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing the voir dire process).
10. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (discussing challenges for cause).
11. See infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (discussing peremptory challenges).
12. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
13. 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
14. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
15. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
16. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
17. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
19. 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
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extension of Batson2° and J.E.B.2" to include challenges based on group
characteristics other than race or gender. Part V asserts that unless the
legislative bodies recognize the implications of J.E.B.,2 2 and act accordingly,
any future restrictions on peremptory challenges may mark the end of them.
I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
23
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
expresses the essence of the balance between the directives of equal
protection and the historical applications of peremptory challenges.24 As
the Supreme Court stated in Strauder v. West Virginia:25
[The Fourteenth Amendment] is... declaring that the law in
the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all
persons ... shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and,
in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment
was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made
against them by law ....2
Since that time, the Court has reiterated this principle enunciated in
Strauder" in the context of jury selection.28 More recently, the Court in

20. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
21. 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
22. Id.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
24. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1435 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated:
In balancing the dictates of equal protection and the historical practice of
peremptory challenges, long recognized as securing fairness in trials, the Court [in
Batson] concluded that the command of the Equal Protection Clause was superior.
But the Court was careful that its rule not "undermine the contribution the challenge
generally makes to the administration of justice.
Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 98-99).
25. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). In Strauder, the defendant, an African-American, was
convicted of murder and sentenced. Id. at 304. Strauder asserted that the State denied his
constitutional equal protection rights. Id. The Court liberally interpreted the intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment and determined that the West Virginia statute was unconstitutional--that
African-Americans could not be excluded from the jury selection process on account of their
race or color. Id. at 305-07. The Strauder Court concluded by augmenting its holding to
describe acceptable restrictions, such as males, age, and educational qualifications. Id. at 310.
26. Id. at 307.
27. Id. The Court in Strauderheld that the State may not exclude members of the
defendant's race from the jury venire solely on account of their race. Id. at 310.
28. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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J.E.B.29 considered the constitutionality of gender-based peremptory
strikes.3"
A. JURY SELECTION AND THE HISTORY OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

The jury should function as a democratic association of individuals."a
Thus, it follows that the jury selection procedure is an important instrument
in obtaining justice.32 This section provides a succinct overview of the
jury selection procedure with regard to peremptory challenges in order to
present a basic understanding of J.E.B.33 and its predecessors. 4
Jury selection procedure begins with the compiling of a list of
prospective jurors by government officials.
From this "wheel, 3 6 panels
(venires) are selected and summoned to court for jury duty. 7 Prospective
jurors are then questioned by both the prosecution and defense counsel
during a process called voir dire 3 and any juror may be challenged for
cause. 39 A challenge for cause excuses a potential juror upon the revelation of a specific bias which threatens the jury's impartiality.' The court
29. 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
30. Id.
31. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at I (maintaining that "[t]he jury is the most democratic
of our institutions").
32. Id.
33. 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
34. For a complete treatment of jury selection procedures, see VAN DYKE, supra note
4.
35. See id. at 85.
36. Usage of the jury wheel originated from the 1968 Jury Service and Selection Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69, which provides in part:
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants . . . entitled to trial by jury shall
have the right to . . .juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the
community .... It is further the policy of the United States that all citizens shall
have the opportunity to be considered for service on ...juries ... and shall have
an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose.
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1989 & Supp. V 1993).
37. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 111. Before a potential juror actually steps foot into
the courthouse, though, she or he will have filled out a jury questionnaire (of which a
majority requests to be excused from service); determinations as to the potential juror's
qualifications will be made; automatic individual exemptions will be considered; and any
excuses will be examined. Id. If the potential juror has successfully overcome these
obstacles, the prospective juror advances to the next stage of jury selection. Id.
38. The word voir dire is a French term which loosely translates into "to see what is
said," or "to speak the truth." Id. at 140.
39. Id. at 139-40.
40. Id.
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provides for an unlimited number of challenges for cause.' In addition,
each side may exercise peremptory challenges to strike jurors.42 A
peremptory challenge removes a potential juror without a specific or distinct
reason or showing of bias.4 3 The function of the peremptory challenge, as
articulated in Swain v. Alabama," is "to eliminate the extremes of partiality
on both sides, [and] to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they
try the case will5decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and
4
not otherwise."
Though the Constitution does not expressly provide a right to peremptory
challenges,' a 1790 federal statute47 secured the right of peremptory
challenge,4 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 49 have incorporated that right.50 State statutes have paralleled this development by guaranteeing the right to peremptory challenges in one form or another.5'
41. Id.
42. Id. at 139. The federal and state legislatures determine the number of peremptory
challenges that may be exercised, depending upon the type of case at trial, i.e., capital,
felony, misdemeanor, or civil. Id. at 282-84.
43. Id. at 139-40. Peremptory challenges may be exercised in those events when an
attorney is incapable of proving a potential juror's bias to the satisfaction of the presiding
judge. Id. at 146. Thus, the nature of peremptory challenges is "truly arbitrary" and can be
utilized solely on the "attorney's intuition." Id.
44. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
45. Id. at 219; see also State v. Thompson, 206 P.2d 1037 (Ariz. 1949) (concluding
that "[t]he essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a
reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control").
46. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (reasoning that "[tihere is
nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant
peremptory challenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that
is secured").
47. 1 STAT. 119 (1790).
48. Id. ("And be it further enacted, [t]hat if any person or persons ... shall challenge
peremptorily ....).
49. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
50. Id. Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(b) Peremptory Challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by death, each
side is entitled to 20 peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year, the government is entitled to 6 peremptory
challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly to 10 peremptory challenges. If
the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or
by fine or both, each side is entitled to 3 peremptory challenges. If there is more
than one defendant, the court may allow the defendants additional peremptory
challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
51. See, e.g., Ala. R. Civ. P. 47; 705 ILCS 5/2-1106 (civil); 725 ILCS 5/115-4
(criminal); Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 9.36; see also VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 281-84.
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The goal of the jury selection process is to achieve a fair and impartial
jury.52 The challenges are designed to remove extreme segments of the
venire and to enhance the achievement of a fair and impartial jury.5 3
B. CURRENT EXAMINATION OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

The modem approach taken by the Court in resolving whether jury
selection procedures violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment' has been gleaned from a number of decisions55 and has
been the model since Swain v. Alabama. 6 Initially, the defendant must
present evidence indicating that she or he is a member of a cognizable racial
group, 57 and that the prosecutor has exercised the peremptory challenges
against members of the defendant's race to remove them from the venire.58
The defendant is then allowed to rely on the undisputed fact that peremptory
challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits "those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." 59 Next, the defendant

52. See VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 85; see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 305 (1879) (determining that every United States citizen on trial has a right to have a
jury selected and impanelled without employing racially discriminatory measures); Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (stating that "the system should guarantee not only freedom
from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution")
(quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
53. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 218-21 (1965).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
55. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479-81 (1954) (establishing the existence
of an Hispanic class, then satisfying a prima facie case of racial discrimination by providing
statistical evidence showing that no eligible individual with aMexican or Latino surname had
ever served on a jury in Jackson County, Texas); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591
(1935) (making out a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection by adducing
evidence from a court reporter and jury commissioners who testified that no AfricanAmericans had ever served on a jury in Jackson County, Alabama); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339 (1879).
56. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
57. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (concluding that "the [cognizable
racial] group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment
under the laws, as written or as applied" (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 478-79)).
58. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. This burden is met by the court examining all conditions
surrounding the case, e.g., finding a methodical strike pattern, or finding an inference during
voir dire in the prosecutor's questions and statements. Id. at 96-97.
59. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953). The defendant in Avery, an AfricanAmerican, appealed his rape conviction where an all-white jury had convicted him and
sentenced him to death. Id. at 560. Avery contended that the jury selection procedures
violated the provisions of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. At that time, Georgia law
provided that the list of prospective jurors be selected from county tax returns and printed
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must demonstrate that the extrinsic facts and circumstances would presume
that the prosecutor used racially motivated reasons to bar the venire
persons from the petit jury. 6° After the defendant has established a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the State to provide a neutral explanation for
challenging the juror.61 In Batson v. Kentucky,62 the Court examined
these factors in a case involving an African-American defendant and an allwhite jury.63
C. THE BATSON V. KENTUCKY" DECISION

In Batson,65 a grand jury indicted the defendant for residential
burglary and the receipt of stolen goods. 66 During the voir dire process at
trial, the prosecutor removed some potential jurors for cause.67 Following
the challenges for cause, the judge allowed both sides to employ peremptory
challenges to empanel a jury." Four African-American jurors remained
until the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges and excused them,
leaving an all-white jury.69 Prior to the jury being sworn in, defense
counsel moved and requested a hearing on his motion that the prosecution's
actions of excusing the remaining African-American jurors constituted a
on tickets, the names of white persons printed on white paper, aid African-Americans on
yellow paper. Id. Upon the judge selecting the specified number of tickets, the clerk would
sort the tickets and prepare the list of persons to be notified to serve. Id. at 561. The Avery
Court determined that the use of white and yellow tickets facilitated discrimination by those
who "were of a mind" to discriminate. Id. at 562. The Court ruled that the defendant
established a prima facie showing of discrimination in the construction of the jury panel. Id.
at 561.
60. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The Batson Court required the defendant to utilize facts
and relevant situations to raise an inference that the prosecutor prohibited certain venirepersons from serving on the petit jury by using racially exclusionary practices. Id.
61. Id.; see also Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258
(1981) (reasoning that the responsibility to shift the burden of proof to demonstrate a neutral
explanation arises from the need to rebut the inference of discrimination ensuing from the
prima facie case and from the condition that the plaintiff be given "a full and fair
opportunity" to show pretext); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1132 (2d Cir. 1984)
(holding that the neutral explanation need not rise to the level of cause and that the neutral
explanation is not unduly onerous when a defendant's life or liberty is at risk).
62. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
63. Id. at 82-83.

64. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 83.
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violation of Batson's Sixth Amendment" and Fourteenth Amendment 7'
rights. 72 The trial court denied defense counsel's motion, and the jury
ultimately convicted Batson on both counts. 3 The Supreme Court of
Kentucky affirmed the conviction, 74 relying on the holding in Swain v.
Alabama.7'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 76 to
consider whether the prosecutor's act of excluding African-American jurors
from the venire constituted a violation of Batson's Fourteenth Amendment
right and his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury extracted from a
cross section of the community.77
70. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The defendant argued that he had a right "to a jury
drawn from a cross section of the community." Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
72. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. The defendant contended that his equal protection rights
had been violated by the prosecutor's systematic use of discriminatory peremptory challenges.
Id. at 84.
73. Id. at 83.
74. Id. at 84. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that Batson must show a
systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the venire in order to succeed on an equal
protection claim. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. McFerron, 680 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Ky.
1984) (determining that underrepresentation of groups constitutes systematic exclusion).
75. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). In Swain, the defendant, an African-American, was
convicted of rape and sentenced to death by an all-white jury. Id. at 203. Swain asserted
that his equal protection rights were violated by the prosecutor's employment of peremptory
challenges to deliberately eliminate all African-Americans from his jury. Id. at 203-05. The
Swain Court recognized that racial discrimination in jury selection is unconstitutional, yet
determined that the issue was not the discrimination, but rather, the "quantum of proof
necessary" to substantiate it. Id. at 205; see also Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 597-98
(1935) (showing long-standing, unvarying, and complete exclusion of African-Americans
from jury service denied defendant equal protection under Fourteenth Amendment); Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131 (1940) (showing deliberate and methodical exclusion of AfricanAmericans from jury service on account of their race denied defendant equal protection of
the law).
The Swain Court then described the burden of proof necessary for the defendant to
establish his claim. Id. at 223. The Court stated that:
[W]hen the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim
may be, is responsible for the removal of [African-Americans] who have
been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have
survived challenges for cause, with the result that no [African-Americans]
ever serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes on added
significance.
Id. at 223. The Court ruled that Swain had not met the burden of proof by establishing
repeated conduct of racial exclusion. Id. at 224.
76. Batson v. Kentucky, 471 U.S. 1052 (1985).
77. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986). Following the decision in Swain,
lower courts concluded that proof of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause required
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1. Exclusion from Venire
The Court in Batson78 commenced its analysis by reiterating the
holding in Strauder v. West Virginia, 9 that an equal protection violation
occurs, and the first element of a prima facie case of discriminatory jury
selection is satisfied, when a person is tried before a jury from which
members of that person's race have been deliberately excluded.80 The
Court simply concluded that exclusion of certain individual jurors from jury
duty through peremptory challenges during the jury selection process is
subject to the equal protection principles of the Fourteenth Amendment, 8'
and thus, Batson's claim fell under the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Therefore, the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the
prosecutor exercised the peremptory challenges for the purpose of removing
African-Americans from the venire.83
The Batson Court created a two-part test for establishing a prima facie
case of discriminatory selection of the venire."4 First, the defendant must
show that she or he is a member of a cognizable racial group.8 5 Second,
the defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory

verification of repeated striking of African-Americans from jury panels or venires. Id. at 9293; see, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850, 859-60 (10th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Boykin, 679 F.2d 1240, 1245 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207,
1213-18 (5th Cir. 1971); Thigpen v. State, 270 So. 2d 666, 673 (Ala. Civ. App. 1972);
Jackson v. State, 432 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Ark. 1968); Johnson v. State, 262 A.2d 792. 796-97
(Md. 1970); State v. Johnson, 311 A.2d 389 (N.J. Super. 197'3) (per curiam); State v. Shaw,
200 S.E.2d 585 (N.C. 1973).
The Court recognized this burden of proof as "crippling," perhaps in some
circumstances, "insurmountable." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. Thus, the Court ruled that a prima
facie showing did not require repetitive cases of racial discrimination, but that a defendant
could satisfy her or his burden with a single showing of purposeful racial discrimination in
jury selection. Id. at 95; see also Village of Arlington Hts. v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (finding a constitutional violation even though statistics did not
advance the claim). Id. at 266 n.13.
The Court did not review Batson's Sixth Amendment claim, simply stating that
"resolution of [the defendant's] claim properly turns on application of equal protection
principles." Id. at 84 n.4.
78. 476 U.S. 79 (1985).
79. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
80. Id. at 312.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
82. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
83. Id. at 96.
84. Id.
85. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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challenges to remove members of the defendant's race from the venire. 1
According to the Court's approach, the trial court should assess all pertinent
circumstances which may lead to an inference of discrimination."' For
instance, the trial court should consider the prosecutor's "pattern" of strikes
against African-Americans in the particular jury pool to decide whether an
inference of discrimination could be made. 8 In Batson, 9 the Court
concluded that the defendant demonstrated the prosecution's pattern of
peremptory strikes against the remaining African-American jurors in the jury
pool 9° and made a timely objection, 9 thus satisfying the first element of
the prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection. 92
2. The Inference of Purposeful Discrimination
The second element of the prima facie case of discriminatory jury
selection is that the defendant may rely on the undisputed fact that
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection strategy that allows "those
to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. 9 3 Proof of this element
requires that the defendant show that members of her or his race have not
been called upon to serve as jurors over an extended time period in that
particular jurisdiction.' Evidence of the methodical racial or class-based

86. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
87. Id. at 96-97.

88. Id. at 97. Methodical and systematic exclusion of African-American jurors via
peremptory strikes from the venire could be considered a pattern, as can be striking AfricanAmericans from the venire in response to certain voir dire questions, while not striking other

jurors who provided the same response. Id.
89. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
90. Id. at 100.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
94. 476 U.S. at 94; see also Castaneda,430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). In Castaneda,the
defendant, a Mexican-American, was convicted of residential burglary and intent to rape and
was sentenced to eight years. Id. at 485. Partida contended that the jury selection methods

used in Hidalgo County were discriminatory and supported his contention by citing statistics
from grand jury records over a ten-year period, showing that Spanish-surnamed persons were
systematically excluded from jury service. Id. at 486. The CastanedaCourt determined that
a statistical showing of discriminatory practices in grand jury selection may be utilized in
order to show a violation of equal protection principles, and that Partida satisfied his burden
of proof. Id. at 494-96. The Court held that Partida established a prima facie claim of
discriminatory purpose, thus shifting the burden of proving no discrimination to the State.
Id. at 495.
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prohibition of jurors from the venire fosters an inference of purposeful
discrimination because the outcome manifestly evinces discrimination.95
3. The Exclusion of Potential Jurors
The third element of the prima facie case of discriminatory jury
selection is that the defendant must establish that these facts and any other
pertinent conditions foster an inference that the prosecutor used that practice
to exclude the potential jurors from the petit jury on account of their race."
Conditions which may be considered pertinent include the types of questions
asked of the venire persons, statements made by either the prosecutor or the
venire person during the voir dire process, or the non-exclusion of a juror
who made remarks similar to a juror who was excluded.97
Once the defendant has established a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination,9" the burden then shifts to the State to provide a neutral
explanation for challenging the African-American jurors.99 The Batson1°°
Court did not explicitly define "neutral explanation."'10 1 However, the
Court provided an example of an unacceptable explanation.' 0 2 Prosecutors
are prohibited from basing their explanation upon the false assumption that
an African-American juror would be partial to a African-American defendant
because of their shared race. 0 3 After receiving the prosecutor's explanaif the prosecutor purposefully discriminated
tion, the trial court determines
4
defendant.'
the
against

95. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (stating that the "result bespeaks
discrimination" when no members of Mexican descent had been called to jury service in 25
years); see also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977) (determining that an inference of purposeful discrimination requires a sensitive inquiry
into any evidence of intent).
96. Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
97. Id. at 97.
98. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing the inference of
purposeful discrimination).
99. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
100. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
101. Id. at 97.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 98. The Court stated that purposeful discrimination is a question of fact
determined at the trial court level, and that the appellate court should afford deference to the
trial court. Id. n.21 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-76 (1985)).
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In Batson," s the trial court summarily overruled the defendant's
objection to the prosecutor's elimination of African-Americans on the
venire, without requiring the prosecutor to provide a neutral explanation for
each of the strikes.'06 Thus, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
trial court to determine whether the facts established a prima facie case for
purposeful discrimination, and if so, whether the prosecutor could provide
a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges. 7
Courts in various jurisdictions have applied and extended the Batson0 8 rationale to other classifications, such as religion,"° other ethnic
groups," and gender."' Nevertheless, some jurisdictions have resisted
extending Batson"2 to gender classifications." 3 The Supreme Court
resolved the issue of the constitutionality of gender-based peremptory
challenges in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B." 4
5
II. J.E.B. v. ALABAMA EX REL. T.B.1

A. FACTS

Phillip Rhett Bowman Bible was born on May 6, 1989 to Teresa Bible
(T.B.). 1 6 Shortly thereafter, the State of Alabama, on behalf of Phillip's
105. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
106. Id. at 100.
107. Id.
108. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
109. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (determining that a state law granting
preference to one religion is suspect and must be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard
of review).
110. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (extending the Batson rationale
to Latinos); Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (extending the Batson rationale to AfricanAmericans and Hispanics, but refusing to retroactively reconsider the merits of the case).
111. See United States v. DeGross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990); 960 F.2d 1433
(1992) (en banc) (extending the Batson rationale to prohibit gender-based peremptory
challenges in civil and criminal trials).
112. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
113. See United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1993) (determining that
Batson is not applicable to gender); United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1080 (1992) (declining to extend Batson to gender); United States v.
Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1069 (1990) (applying Batson as to the race-based peremptory challenges, but not
to gender-based peremptory challenges).
114. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
115. Id.
116. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., No. 92-1239, October Term 1993, Joint Appendix;
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mother, filed a complaint against James E. Bowman, Sr. ("J.E.B.") for
paternity and child support,"" and the trial began on October 21,
1991."' The task of jury selection began with a venire of sixty-two
members. 9 The court struck every other venire member until thirty-six
Three jurors were
remained," twelve men and twenty-four women.'
Alaexcused for cause, leaving twenty-three females and ten males."
the
reduce
to
selection
jury
of
method"'"
jury
"struck
a
employs
bama
Rules
Alabama
the
with
accordance
is
in
number of jurors to twelve, which
of Civil Procedure. 12 ' Counsel for J.E.B. and T.B. alternately struck
jurors. ' 5 While J.E.B.'s attorney used all of his peremptory challenges
to strike all but one female juror, 26 counsel for T.B. exercised all of her
juror.'27 At the end of
peremptory challenges to exclude all but one male
2
voir dire, the jury consisted of twelve females.
B. PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Prior to empaneling the jury, counsel for J.E.B. objected to the State's
use of peremptory strikes, arguing that they were applied entirely on the
basis of gender to purposefully exclude male jurors, in violation of the
29
Defense
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
30
Kentucky,'
v.
Batson
of
reasoning
and
counsel argued that the holding

see also Leonard Mandell, Extending Batson v. Kentucky: Do Gender-Based Peremptory
Challenges Violate the Constitutional Guarantee of Equal Protection?, 1993-1994 ABA
PREVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 57, 57.
117. J.E.B. v. State ex rel. T.B., 606 So. 2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), cert. denied,
No. 1911717 (Oct. 23, 1992); see also Mandell, supra note 116, at 57.
118. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
119. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, No. 92-1239.
120. Id.
121. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
122. Id. at 1421-22.
123. ALA. R. Civ. P. 47; see also VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 146-47.
124. ALA. R. CIv. P. 47 (providing that "[r]egular jurors shall be selected from a list
containing the names of at least twenty-four competent jurors and shall be obtained by the
parties or their attorneys alternately striking one from the list until twelve remain, the party
demanding the jury commencing").
125. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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which prohibits racially-motivated peremptory strikes, 31 should be applied
32
to the instant case to similarly prohibit gender-based discrimination.
The trial court overruled J.E.B.'s objection and empaneled the jury of twelve
females. 33 The jury determined that J.E.B. was the father of the
child,' 34 and the court ordered him to pay child support. 135 On a postjudgment motion, the court reaffirmed its decision that Batson' 36 does not
extend to gender-based peremptory challenges. 137 On appeal, the Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, 3 and the Supreme Court of Alabama
denied certiorari. 39 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari" to settle the disparity among state and federal courts as to whether the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 4' prohibits genderbased peremptory challenges as it prohibits race-based peremptory challenges. 42

131. Id. at 89.
132. 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
133. Id. The trial court refused to extend the principles of Batson to gender-based
peremptory challenges. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., Respondent's Brief on the Merits,
No. 92-1239 (1993).
134. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422. The result of an HLA tissue test presented at trial
showed a cumulative probability of paternity with 99.92 percent accuracy. Id. at 1437
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1422.
136. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
137. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
138. J.E.B. v. State ex rel. T.B., 606 So. 2d 156 (1992). The Appellate Court relied
upon Alabama precedent, establishing that Batson did not apply to gender-based peremptory
challenges. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 596 So. 2d 42 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied,
596 So. 2d 45 (Ala. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 827 (1992).
139. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., No. 1911717 (Ala. Oct 23, 1992).
140. 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993).
141. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
142. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422 (1994). Federal Courts of Appeals have split on the
issue of whether gender-based peremptory challenges are constitutional. See United States
v. DeGross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990); 960 F.2d 1433, 1437-43 (1992) (en banc)
(expanding Batson to disallow gender-based peremptory challenges in criminal trials, i.e.,
aiding and abetting the moving of an alien within the United States, and civil trials). But see
United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 218-20 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that gender
discrimination and racial discrimination are distinctive and thus, declining to extend Batson
to gender-based peremptory challenges); United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262-64
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1080 (1992) (declining to extend Batson to gender
with respect to the defense's objection regarding the government's employment of
peremptory challenges to oust all African-American females from the jury); United States v.
Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990) (striking an African-American female from the venire is
valid'as long as the reason was not based on race).
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One other issue J.E.B. argued on appeal was that because the State did
not demonstrate an appropriate chain of custody, the blood test results
should not have been introduced into evidence. 143 In addition, J.E.B.
argued that the trial court should not have admitted into evidence the DNA
test results without confirming first that the DNA test met the criteria of the
court's holding in a prior case. 44 The Civil Appeals Court reviewed the
relevant testimony and determined the custodial chain was sufficiently
established. 45 The court also distinguished its prior ruling in the previous
did not
case and did not apply those admissibility requirements.' 46 J.E.B.
47

challenge these two issues in the United States Supreme Court.

State courts have also ruled on the constitutionality of gender-based peremptory
challenges. See Laidler v. State, 627 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (extending
Batson to encompass gender-based peremptory challenges); State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845,
849 (Haw. 1990) (holding that Batson applies to peremptory challenges based on gender);
People v. Mitchell, 593 N.E.2d 882 (III. App. Ct. 1992), affd in part and vacated in relevant
part, 614 N.E.2d 1213 (Ill. 1993) (stating that Batson applies to gender-based peremptory
challenges); Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 648 (Md. 1993) (relying on State Constitution to
determine that Batson applies to gender-based peremptory challenges); Commonwealth v.
Hutchinson, 481 N.E.2d 188, 190 (Mass. 1985) (stating that the elements of a prima facie
case of race-based discrimination in peremptory challenges as articulated in Batson apply to
gender); State v. Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 806 P.2d 65
(N.M. 1991) (ruling that gender-based peremptory challenges are governed by the Batson
standards); People v. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that Batson
should be extended to include gender); State v. Burch, 830 P.2d 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(relying on State and Federal Constitutions to hold that gender-based peremptory challenges
are subject to the Batson principles). But see Murphy v. State, 596 So. 2d 42 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1991), writ denied, 596 So. 2d 45 (Ala. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992)
(declining to extend the Batson principle to gender-based strikes); State v. Adams, 533 So.
2d 1060, 1063 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting the argument to extend Batson to include
gender), cert. denied, 540 So. 2d 338 (La. 1989); State v. Clay, 779 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Mo.
App. 1989) (declining to extend Batson to gender); State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662 (Neb.
1989) (refusing to determine the constitutionality of gender-based peremptory challenges
consistent with Batson principles); State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987) (deciding
not to broaden the Batson principles to include gender).
143. J.E.B. v. State ex rel. T.B., 606 So. 2d 156, 157 (1992).
144. Id. at 157. The prior case of Ex Parte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242 (Ala. 1991), concerns
DNA test result admissibility in a forensic setting, as opposed to a clinical setting. Id. The
appellate court in J.E.B. held that the Perry admissibility standards were not applicable in
a paternity case. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994).
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C. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION

Justice Blackmun, in his majority opinion, initially restated the holding
from Batson v. Kentucky,'48 that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 49 controls the prosecutorial usage of peremptory
challenges in a criminal proceeding,5 ° and reiterating a brief rationale
from Batson v. Kentucky, 5 ' that the "defendant does have the right to be
tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory
criteria."'5 2 Though it logically follows that equal protection principles
apply to gender discrimination as well, all post-Batson cases5 3 have
exclusively addressed the exercise of race-based peremptory challenges." 5
J.E.B.155 presented the question of whether gender-based peremptory
challenges injury selection proceedings violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,' 56 and the Supreme Court held that such
57
a violation did, in fact, exist.
Part II of Justice Blackmun's opinion Ss reviews the historical
exclusion of women and African-Americans from jury service.' 59 Justice
Blackmun noted that gender-based discrimination in jury selection is a
somewhat modem practice, and even until as late as 1961, women were still
being excluded from serving as jurors. 6° The Court recognized that the

148. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

149. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
150. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
151. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
152. 114 S. Ct. at 1421 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 85-86).
153. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
154. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421; see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that
Batson principles apply to race-based peremptory challenges even when the defendant and
the excluded jurors were not of the same race); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614 (1991) (ruling that the Batson holding applies to civil cases); Georgia v. McCollum,
505 U.S. 42 (1992) (prohibiting a criminal defendant from exercising race-based peremptory
challenges during jury selection).
155. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
157. 114 S.Ct. at 1421. "Intentional discrimination on the basis of gender by state
actors violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where, as here, the discrimination
serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative
abilities of men and women." Id. at 1422.
158. Part I includes a recital of the facts and procedural posture. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina were still excluding women from
jury service in 1961. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
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exclusion of women from juries dates back over 100 years,' 6 ' and contin-

ued despite the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment 162 in 1920.163
The Court then discussed the history of the prohibition of women on
juries, originating from the English common law," 64 American support of
the exclusion,
and finally ending with a review of the decision in
Ballard v. United States."
In Ballard,67 the Supreme Court held that
women may not be prohibited from jury service in federal trials in states
where women were qualified for jury service under local law.'6 Later,
though, in Hoyt v. Florida,169 the Supreme Court allowed the exemption

161. Id. at 1422-23; see Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). Even
though the exclusion of African-Americans from jury service violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Strauder Court held that a State "may confine the selection [of jurors] to
males." Id.; see also Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289-90 (1947). However, in 1870,
the Territory of Wyoming allowed women to serve on juries, and they did, until a new chief
justice who disfavored the practice disallowed it in 1871. See 114 S. Ct. at 1423 n.2; see
also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice and Juror, 20 GA. L. REV. 257, 263-64 (1986)
(discussing the history of women in jury service).
162. The Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part:
"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
163. 114 S. Ct. at 1423; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; see also Rudolph, Women on
the Jury--Voluntary or Compulsory?, 44 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 206 (1961). States that did permit
women to serve as jurors established registration requirements and automatic exemptions to
deter women from exercising their right to serve. See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
289 (1947); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
164. 114 S. Ct. at 1423.
165. Id.
166. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
167. Id.
168. 114 S. Ct. at 1424. The Court explained:
It is said ... that an all male panel drawn from the various groups within
a community will be as truly representative as if women were included.
The thought is that the factors which tend to influence the action of women
are the same as those which influence the action of men--personality,
background, economic status, and not sex. Yet it is not enough to say that
women when sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to act as a class. Men
likewise do not act like a class .... The truth is that the two sexes are not
fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a
community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence of one on
the other is among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from
either may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a
distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.
Id. at 1423 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94) (footnotes omitted).
169. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
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of women from statutorily mandated jury service by reasoning that a
woman's position was at "the center of home and family life."'7 0
The Court concluded its historical discussion by citing Taylor v.
Louisiana.17' Employing a rationale based on the Sixth Amendment's
72 the
right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the 7community,
4
Florida.
Court in Taylor17 effectively overruled Hoyt v.
75
In Part III of the majority opinion, the Court segued from Taylor's
Sixth Amendment rationale to an equal protection approach by simply
stating that the Taylor 7 1 opinion was "consistent with the heightened
equal protection scrutiny afforded gender-based classifications"' 77 since
170. Id. at 62. In Hoyt, the defendant, a female, was charged with killing her husband
with a baseball bat upon learning of his extramarital affair, and subsequently convicted of
second degree murder by an all-male jury. Id.at 58. Hoyt asserted that the Florida jury
statute unconstitutionally excluded women from jury service, a violation of her equal
protection rights. Id. Though the Florida jury law required that qualified males and females
be chosen for jury duty, the law contained a stipulation that females would not be
automatically placed on the jury list; they would have to specifically request that the clerk
register them for jury duty. Id. The Hoyt Court contended that the statute allowed women
to serve on juries, but did not compel them to do so. Id. at 60. The issue on appeal was
whether the exemption was reasonably classified and whether the means were rationally
founded. Id. The Court determined that a "woman is still regarded as the center of home
and family life," and that the exemption was constitutionally permissible because relieving
women from jury service was in the State's interest of furthering the general welfare. Id. at
62.
Furthermore, even though only 220 women requested jury service (out of a possible
46,000 registered women voters--approximately 40 percent of the county population), the
Hoyt Court determined that proportional class representation was not constitutionally
significant or required. Id. at 64-69. The Court ruled that Hoyt failed to show that the
Florida statute purposely excluded women from jury service and therefore affirmed her
conviction. Id. at 69.
171. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
172. Id.

173. Id.
174. 114 S. Ct. at 1424. Taylor was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced
to death, which sentence was later set aside in favor of a life sentence. Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1975). Taylor appealed on the grounds that the Louisiana statute,
which excluded women from jury service, excepting those who had requested in writing to
the clerk to be placed on the jury service list, violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to an impartial jury trial. Id. at 523-25. The Taylor Court determined that while
defendants are not entitled to a proportional composition of jurors reflective of the
community, the jury wheel, panel, or venire from which jurors are drawn must be chosen
from a fair cross section of the community, and not exclude any distinctive groups, in accord
with Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment principles. Id. at 538.

175. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
176. Id.
177. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1424 (1994).
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Reed v. Reed.178 Next, the Court addressed T.B.'s argument that gender
discrimination in the voir dire process should be allowed because it has not
reached the same level of discrimination as of that against AfricanAmericans. 179 Justice Blackmun emphasized that the issue is not who
suffered more,"s ' but rather, acknowledging that "our Nation has had a
long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,"1' ' and that history
warrants the heightened scrutiny provided to all gender-based classifications.18 2 Thus, the Court considered whether gender-based peremptory
challenges were relevant to a litigant's effort to secure a fair and impartial

jury.

183

Respondent T.B. asserted that her gender-based peremptory challenges
were founded on historical attitudes that a man would be more sympathetic
to the alleged father in a paternity action, whereas a woman would be more
sympathetic to the mother.' 84 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun
rejected this argument, stating that T.B. offered essentially no authority for
her proposition that jurors' attitudes are predicated on their gender, 85 and
suggested that her argument assumes that race-based inferences which are
18 6
forbidden are somehow acceptable when made on the basis of gender.
The Court further determined that the existence of quantitative data linking
gender-based attitudes to juror behavior cannot advance gender-based
discrimination in jury selection.' 87
178. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that an Idaho statute which gave preference to males
over females in the administration proceedings of an intestate estate violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

179. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., Respondent's Brief on the Merits 9.

J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425.
Id. (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
Id.
Id. at 1426.
Id. at 1426 n.9. T.B. supported her argument by citing REID HASTIE, STEVEN D.
PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 140-41 (1983), where the author stated:
The picture differs for rape cases, where female jurors appear to be
somewhat more conviction-prone than male jurors. . . . The safest
generalization that can be made from all research on gender differences is
that female students are more likely than male students to regard the
defendant in a rape case as guilty and that males participate at higher rates
in deliberation than females.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.

185. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1427.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1427 n.11; see, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975)
(invalidating a Social Security Act classification because it authorized benefits only to
widows notwithstanding that the reason for the difference in treatment was "not entirely
without empirical support"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201 (1976) (determining that an
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The Court then addressed the harm caused by discrimination in the jury
selection process, citing the litigants,' the community,18 9 and the excluded jurors as parties injured by discriminatory selection.", Discriminatory jury selection practices harm the litigants by contaminating the trial
proceedings. 9' Excluding jurors based on stereotypes harms the community because it bolsters group stereotypes, and thus the community loses
faith in our judicial system."9 The individual jurors are harmed by being
improperly prohibited from taking part in the judicial process, impugning the
excluded juror's dignity. 93 If the wrongfully excluded juror is a female,
she is harmed by being reminded of the tortured history of excluding women
from political participation." In addition, Justice Blackmun opined that
the removal of even one juror for an unjust reason harms that juror and
corrupts society's reliance in the justice system's fairness and impartiality.

19 5

The Court then stated that the approach for gender-based claims is
consistent with the Batson'" approach: a party must demonstrate a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination before the opposing party is required
to justify its rationale for exercising the peremptory challenges. 9 7 The
Court thus ultimately held that "the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or on the assumption
that an individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than
the fact that the person happens to be a woman or happens to be a
man."'i98 The majority concluded by maintaining that its holding did not
signify the abolishment of all peremptory challenges.' 99 Rather, "gender
simply may not serve as a proxy for bias."2' ' °
Oklahoma law establishing different drinking ages for men and women was unconstitutional,
though the supporting evidence was "not trivial in a statistical sense").
188. 114 S. Ct. at 1427; see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,
620 (1991) (stating that litigants are harmed by the denial of not being able to select
impartial triers of fact).
189. 114 S. Ct. at 1427.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1428.
194. Id.; see also supra notes 160-74 and accompanying text (discussing the historical
exclusion of women and African-Americans from jury service).
195. Id. at 1428 n.13.
196. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
197. 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
198. Id. at 1430.
199. Id. at 1429.
200. Id.
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In her concurring opinion,201 Justice O'Connor stated that the holding
in J.E.B.2' 2 "should be limited to the government's use of gender-based
peremptory strikes."' 3 She maintained that the Equal Protection Clause
forbids discrimination by state actors, not private litigants. 20 4 She discussed the possible consequences of the holding, noting that the Court has
"added an additional burden to the state and federal trial process, taken a
step closer to eliminating the peremptory challenge, and diminished the
ability of litigants to act on sometimes accurate gender-based assumptions
about juror attitudes."'
In closing, she hypothesized,
But what of the next case? Will we, in the name of fighting
gender discrimination, hold that the battered wife--on trial for
wounding her abusive husband--is a state actor? Will we preclude
her from using her peremptory challenges to ensure that the jury
of her peers contains as many women members as possible? I
assume we will, but I hope we will not.2'
Justice Kennedy also wrote a concurring opinion, 7 but he rationalized why the precedents led to the holding in J.E.B.204 He interpreted the
history of the wording and intent of the Equal Protection Clause to not only
prohibit discrimination on the basis of race but also to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender.2' He stated that the injury stemming from
the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges based on group
attributes is an affront "to personal dignity and to the individual's right to
participate in the political process."'21
Justice Kennedy concluded by
underscoring the holding of the majority, which emphasized that "[o]nce
seated, a juror should not give free rein to some racial or gender bias of his
2 11
or her own."

201. Id. at 1430-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 1419 (1994).
203. Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
204. Id.; see also Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631-44 (1991) (contending that the government should not be
responsible for all that transpires in a court of law, including peremptory challenges by
private litigants).
205. Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 1433 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 1433-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 1433 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 1433-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
210. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1434 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400, 410 (1991)).
211. Id. at 1434 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that
gender-based peremptory challenges should not be elevated to the same level
as race-based peremptory challenges,212 and that the Batson213 decision
"is best understood as a recognition that race lies at the core of the
commands of the Fourteenth Amendment."2'14 Chief Justice Rehnquist
differentiated the two standards of review corresponding to race and
gender. 2 5 Racial classifications are inherently suspect, thus a "strict
scrutiny" standard applies, while gender classifications are accorded a
heightened standard of review, but less than strict scrutiny. 2'6 Therefore,
when gender discrimination and peremptory challenges are in conflict, the
latter should prevail. 7 Concluding, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the
"use of peremptory challenges on the basis of sex is generally not the sort
of derogatory and invidious act which peremptory challenges directed at
black jurors may be. ,211
Also dissenting was Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas. 1 9 Justice Scalia accused the majority of working
"not to eliminate any real denial of equal protection, but simply to pay
conspicuous obeisance to the equality of the sexes."22 Emphasizing that
22
all classifications are susceptible to the peremptory challenge, ' Justice
'
22
As Justice
Scalia maintained that the system is largely "even-handed."
for
challenging
Scalia noted, even though J.E.B. criticized T.B.'s prosecutor
male jurors, J.E.B.'s counsel challenged just as many female jurors.2 3
III. ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court held in Batson v. Kentucky 224 that
a prosecutor may not challenge potential jurors solely on the basis of their
race, or on the assumption that African-Americans as a class could not be

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.I., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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impartial jurors against an African-American defendant. 2" The Court has
since expanded this holding to include both jurors and defendants who are
of different races,2" be they civil litigants227 or criminal litigants.22 '
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals addressed the issue of whether genderbased peremptory challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause,2 29 and
in deferring to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Ex Parte
Murphy,23° the Alabama appellate court did not extend Batson's231' holding to include gender-based peremptory challenges.232
Because J.E.B. did not challenge the chain of custody and the DNA test
requirement issues, the only issue to be determined by the United States
Supreme Court was whether gender-based discrimination in the jury
selection process violates the Equal Protection Clause, 23 just as the
holding in Batson21 prohibits race-based discrimination in the jury
selection process.235 The J.E.B.236 Court correctly held that genderbased discrimination in the jury selection process did violate the Equal
Protection Clause,237 and thus, reversed and remanded this case back to the
appellate court.238 However, the J.E.B.239 Court left some critical issues
unsettled, and this section will confront those issues and recommend
proposals for a resolution of them.
The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its holding in Strauder v. West
Virginia,2' ° that racial discrimination in the selection of jurors denies
African-Americans equal protection of the laws. 241 The Batson24 2 Court

225. Id. at 89.

226. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits a prosecutor from exercising race-based peremptory challenges regardless of
whether the criminal defendant and the excluded jurors are of different races).
227. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that in a
civil trial, a private litigant may not utilize race-based peremptory challenges).
228. See Georgia v. McCullom, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that a criminal defendant
may not employ race-based peremptory challenges).
229. 606 So. 2d 156, 157 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992).
230. 596 So. 2d 42 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (noting that "[tlhe law currently states that
Batson does not extend to gender-based strikes").
231. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
232. 606 So. 2d at 157.
233. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
234. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
235. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1421.
236. Id. at 1419.

237. Id.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 1430.
Id. at 1419.
100 U.S. 303 (1880).
Id. at 310; see also Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v.
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elaborated further to state that "the defendant does have the right to be tried
by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory
criteria."243 J.E.B.2 " begs the question of whether the prohibition of
discrimination should extend to any other classifications. Because people
of a certain race or gender share a history of discrimination during jury
selection,245 the extension of Batson246 to J.E.B.247 is warranted and
necessary. However, any further expansion to other classifications would
erode the vitality of peremptory challenges' s and inevitably lead to their
demise. 249
The J.E.B.'m majority stated that its holding does not suggest the
abolition of peremptory challenges. 25 ' Rather, the Court simply ruled that
"gender may not serve as a proxy for bias. 2 12 The Court goes one step

Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475 (1954); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945);

Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Norris v. Alabama,

294 U.S. 587 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
242. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
243. Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986); see also Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321

(1906); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880).
244. 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
245. Id. at 1425; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973). In
Frontiero,the Court observed that:
[T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our
society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the preCivil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve
on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as
And although blacks were
legal guardians of their own children ....
guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right-which is itself 'preservative of other basic civil and political rights'--until
adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century later.
Eliminating Gender-Based
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Note, Beyond Batson:
Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1920, 1921 (1992) (discussing the history of
discrimination in jury service affecting African-Americans and women).

246. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
247. 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).

248. Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
250. 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
251. Id. at 1429.
252. Id. Indeed, litigants may continue to exercise their peremptory challenges to
discharge any classes typically subject to "rational basis" review from the jury pool. Id.; see
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too far, though, in declaring that peremptory challenges based on attributes

customarily identified with one particular gender could be acceptable, insofar
as pretext is not shown.2 3 Certain fields such as law enforcement,
medicine, construction, and politics have been traditionally male-dominated,
while female-oriented occupations such as court stenography, waitressing,
nursing, and clerical work have been the norm.2
However, social
activism, along with the passage of time, has somewhat softened the genderbased stereotyping of occupations, thus making the majority's premise dated
and weak. The Court's opinion leaves open the possibility that in a future
jury selection process, a peremptory challenge will be held to violate equal
protection principles based on statistical evidence that a particular juror is
employed in a predominantly single-gendered profession. Thus, the Court
should not have left open the possibility of further restrictions on peremptory challenges because by doing so, the255Court has "taken a step closer to
eliminating the peremptory challenge.'

also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985) (concluding that
individuals who are mentally disabled constitute a class subject to rational basis review);
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (invalidating classifications with respect to
illegitimate children).
253. 114 S.Ct. at 1429. The Court further stated:
For example, challenging all persons who have had military experience
would primarily affect men at this time, while challenging all persons
employed as nurses would primarily affect women, skewing the selection
process just as well. These challenges may well be constitutional if no
pretext is shown, since they are not gender- or race-based.
Id. at 1429 n.16; see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (holding that the
exclusion of Latinos from jury service was not pretextual because the Court deemed the
prosecutor's explanation of doubting of the jurors' ability to defer to the official translation
of the testimony as sufficient and race neutral).
254. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1429; see also JAMES H. DAVIS, ET AL., THE EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF DECISION PROCESSES IN JURIES: A CRITICAL REVIEW, IN LAW, JUSTICE AND THE

INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 334 (June L. Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds. 1977) (discussing juror

demographic characteristics such as gender, age, education, and occupation); Keith Mossman,
Jury Selection: An Expert's View, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May 1973, at 78-79 (examining whether
potential jurors could be chosen on the basis of occupation); Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire
Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S.CAL. L. REV. 503, 505-21 (1965).
255. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Maintaining the Sixth Amendment 256 guarantee of a fair and impartial
jury is critical. 2" Historically, peremptory challenges have been a useful,
integral part of jury selection,258 and all fifty states incorporate the
peremptory challenge in their jury selection process.259 In addition to
ensuring the defendant a fair and impartial jury, peremptory challenges also

serve to narrow the number of jurors after the challenges for cause have

been exercised. 260 Removing "extremes of partiality on both sides, 26
is another function of the peremptory challenge.262 As to impartiality, the
issue is not always whether a particular juror is overtly biased,263 but
whether another juror is seemingly less likely to be biased.2'
The

256. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
257. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1126 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that the Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section requirement is justified as fundamental to the jury trial).
258. See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text; see also Pointer v. United States,
151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (preserving peremptory challenges as one of the most vital rights
secured to the defendant); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) (stating that
peremptory challenges are a integral part of jury trials); Comment, The Right of Peremptory
Challenge, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (1957) (advocating the peremptory challenge to eliminate
bias from the courtroom); S. Alexandria Jo, Comment, Reconstruction of the Peremptory
Challenge System: A Look at Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 22 PAC. L.J. 1305
(1991) (discussing the importance of the defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges).
259. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 281-84 (categorizing the number of peremptory
challenges in civil and criminal cases on a state-by-state basis).
260. See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of
peremptory challenges).
261. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
262. Id. at 219 (reasoning that "the peremptory [challenge] permits rejection for a real
or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable") (quoting Hayes v.
Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
263. See generally Edmond Costantini et al., Gender and JurorPartiality: Are Women
More likely to Prejudge Guilt?, 67 JUDICATURE 121, September 1983; Michael G. Efran, The
Effect of Physical Appearance on the Judgment of Guilt, Interpersonal Attraction, and
Severity of Recommended Punishment in a Simulated Jury Task, 8 J. RES. PERSONALITY 45
(1974); Harold Sigall & Nancy Ostrove, Beautiful but Dangerous: Effects of Offender
Attractiveness and Nature of the Crime on Juridic Judgment, 31 J.PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 410 (1975); Cookie Stephan, Sex Prejudice in Jury Simulation, 88 J. PSYCHOL. 305
(1976); Nancy S. Marder, Note, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations,96 YALE L.J.
593 (1987).
264. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-21.
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majority opinion in J.E.B.265 does not reflect the methodology or rationale
used by either the prosecution or the defense in their employment of
peremptory challenges. But because the nature of the litigation was a
paternity suit,2" and the State used nine of its ten peremptory challenges
to strike males from the jury,26 the Court could surmise that gender
discrimination influenced jury selection.
Selection of juries has become a modern business.2 Plaintiffs and
defendants now employ jury consultants to aid in the process of selecting
a jury. 269 Consultants draw a composite of the ideal juror for a particular
case, identify desirable and undesirable character traits, and analyze the
opposing party.270 Considerations include race, gender, education level,
occupation, appearance, political affiliations, and even facial features.271
Undesirable jurors that are not challenged for cause are then removed by use
of peremptory challenges. This is not to say that undesirable jurors would
be unfair or partial, only that each side is seeking a juror who may be more
sympathetic and favorable than another. As a result, peremptory challenges
are used to transform a jury representing a cross-section of the community
into a non-diverse group that may not be responsive to some of the issues
pertaining to the dispute.272 Accordingly, the jury selection process is
fertile ground for abuse. Because of the foregoing, the prevalent abuse of
this selection device with regard to both race and gender discrimination has
undermined its utility and its effectiveness, and therefore, it should be
reexamined.
In order to preserve the balance between the use of peremptory
challenges and equal protection principles, the number of peremptory
challenges must be reduced in an effort to select juries in a nondiscriminatory manner. The elimination of peremptory challenges may be more

265. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
266. Id. at 1421.
267. Id. at 1422.
268. See generally MELVIN M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS (2d ed. 1982).
269. Id. at 462-74 (discussing the role of consultants in the jury selection process).
270. Id. at 462; see also Jay Schulman et al., Recipefor a Jury, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May
1973, at 37.
271. BELLI, supra note 268, at 400-74. For example, marriage makes for a better juror
for a civil plaintiff or a criminal defendant. Id. at 442. To have a more favorable damages
award, peremptorily challenge accountants, statisticians, and bank clerks. Id. at 444.
Waiters, waitresses, and bartenders liken the civil defendant to the "stingy tipper." Id. at 453.
Jurors whose inner eyes are level are logical. Id. at 467. The thickness of the lips connotes
the basic generosity of the personality. Id. at 471. And widely flared nostrils indicate a
great degree of self reliance. Id. at 473.
272. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 222.
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effective in curtailing discrimination during jury selection,273 however,
such challenges are useful in a limited manner and should be retained in a
reduced role.274 By imposing a limit of two peremptory challenges per
side,"' courts could force litigators to be more judicious in making their
challenges. These challenges, of course, would still be subjected to the
restrictions of Batson 276 and J.E.B. 2 7 This solution would also compel
judges and attorneys to conduct voir dire in a more comprehensive manner
and still ensure a fair and impartial jury. Accordingly, the J.E.B.27 s
Court's holding was not nearly as restrictive as it should have been because
it did not foreclose other classifications from coming under the purview of
Batson 279 and J.E.B. 280 and it did not address the reduction of peremptory challenges available to both sides.

273. See Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 10208 (Marshall, J., concurring). For articles advocating the complete elimination of peremptory
challenges, see generally, Elaine A. Carlson, Batson, J.E.B., and Beyond: The Paradoxical
Quest for Reasoned Peremptory Strikes in the Jury Selection Process, 46 BAYLOR L. REV.
947 (1994); Christy Chandler, Race, Gender, and the Peremptory Challenge: A Postmodern
Feminist Approach, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 173 (1995); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender:
Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1041 (1995).
274. Cf. Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries,
86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977) (suggesting that the peremptory challenge be limited to removing
prospective jurors who possess "situation-specific biases"); Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case
for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227,
282-84 (1986) (proposing that, in the alternative to abolishing peremptory challenges, a
smaller number of peremptory challenges should be granted to each side). See generally
Beth S. Ayres, Note, Preempting the Peremptory: An Examination of J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 233 (1994) (advocating a statutory reduction in the
number of peremptory challenges allocated to each party to four or five, but to allow the
parties the right to use them for any reason); Phyllis N. Silverman, Comment, Survey of the
Law of Peremptory Challenges: Uncertainty in the Criminal Law, 44 U. PrIT. L. REV. 673,
702-04 (1983) (discussing positive and negative implications of reducing peremptory
challenges).
275. See William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease But Killing the
Patient, 104 Sup. CT. REV. 97, 147-49 (1987) (recommending the reduction in the number
of peremptory challenges which is comparable to the method observed in England); cf Jere
W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge is No Longer Peremptory: Batson's
Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination From Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL
L. REV. 625 (1994) (considering the effects of limiting the peremptory challenges to two per
side).
276. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
277. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
278. Id.
279. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
280. 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
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IV.

PRACTICAL IMPACT

The probability of extending the holdings of Batson and J.E.B. to
classifications other than race and gender will significantly influence the jury
selection process, particularly in the realm of peremptory challenges. The
simple task of compiling statistics to identify a classification with one
particular gender without showing pretext, thus expanding Batson2"' and
*J.E.B.,282 complicates effective jury selection. Although the J.E.B.283
decision properly disallows gender-based jury selection, it provides serious
opportunities for misuse.
When a litigator reasonably suspects that a juror is peremptorily
challenged because of race or gender, justification exists for an objection by
the opposing party and a neutral explanation by the party exercising the
peremptory challenge. Because J.E.B. 284 allows for other classifications
which may be comprised of predominantly one gender,8 5 more than likely
individuals falling into these other classifications will come forward
requesting equal protection under J.E.B.2 6
Furthermore, this decision may signify the end of peremptory
challenges.287 Under Batson,8 s a party may not discriminate on the
basis of race in exercising peremptory challenges.28 9 Under J.E.B., 290
a party may not discriminate on the basis of gender in exercising peremptory
challenges. 29' However, if a prospective juror is peremptorily challenged,
and if it can be established that he or she is a member of a group that is
made up of predominantly one gender, many courts may be persuaded that
the party alleging a violation of equal protection principles has made a
prima facie showing of intentional discrimination. The party exercising the
challenge will then be required to provide a neutral explanation for the
challenge. 2" Accordingly, the peremptory challenge becomes more like a

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

476 U.S. 79 (1986).
114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
Id.
Id.
See notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
Id. at 1432.

289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 89.
114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
Id. at 1421.
See 476 U.S. at 97.

288. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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challenge for cause,293 thus eliminating the historical importance of the
peremptory challenge.2
V. CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court correctly applied the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and expanded the holding of Batson
v. Kentucky 295 to J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,2 96 prohibiting gender
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 297 However, in
doing so, the Court left the door open for other groups to contest the
validity of a litigant's use of a peremptory challenge, provided the group can
show it possesses attributes traditionally or statistically associated with one
gender, without showing pretext.298
This decision will have a notable impact on the jury selection process.
Following the decision reached in J.E.B.,29 litigators will have to present
a race-neutral or gender-neutral explanation for every peremptory challenge
they exercise, in the event an objection is made. 3°° Considering the
importance in securing an impartial jury consistent with equal protection
principles, it is conceivable that the Supreme Court will define further
constitutional boundaries of peremptory challenges during jury selection.
Consequently, unless the legislature balances the principles of equal
protection with the peremptory challenge and reduces the number of
peremptory challenges allowed to a litigant, 301 this decision will likely
3°
mark the elimination of all peremptory challenges. 1
STACEY L. WICHTERMAN

293. 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
294. See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text (discussing the history of peremptory
challenges).
295. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
296. 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
297. Id. at 1429.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1419.
300. Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
301. See supra notes 273-280; cf Silverman, supra note 274, at 702-04 (discussing
legislative solutions).
302. 114 S.Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).

